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SECURITIES REGULATION-Sale of Business Doctrine: Landreth
Timber Company v. Landreth

I. INTRODUCTION

In Landreth Timber Company v. Landreth,' the United States Supreme

Court addressed the issue of whether the sale of all the stock in a closelyheld corporation was a securities transaction and therefore subject to the
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws ("Acts"). 2 The courts
of appeals and commentators 3 had split over this question. The Seventh, 4
Ninth, 5 Tenth, 6 and Eleventh7 Circuits had recognized a "sale of business"
exception to the Acts' coverage. These circuits had looked through the
form of challenged transactions and examined the underlying economic
substance. They reasoned that purchasers were in reality buying a business. Since sales of businesses were not securities transactions, stock
sales designed to accomplish this same end should similarly not be transactions subject to the Acts' coverage.' Furthermore, purchasers who assumed control of a business were not the kind of passive investors the
Acts were designed to protect. 9
In contrast, the Second,'" Third," Fourth, 2 Fifth,' 3 and Eighth 4 Cir1. 105 S.Ct. 2297 (1985).
2. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881
(1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§78a-78kk (1976)). See infra notes 32-34 and 64 for
text in pertinent part.
3. Compare, e.g. Seldin, When Stock Is Not a Security: The "Sale of Business" Doctrine Under
the Federal Securities Laws, 37 Bus.LAW. 637 (1982); Thompson, The Shrinking Definition of a
Security: Why Purchasing All of a Company's Stock Is Not a Federal Securities Transaction, 57
N.Y.U. L. REv. 225 (1982) (both supporting the doctrine) with, e.g. Hazen, Taking Stock of Stock
and the Sale of Closely Held Corporations: When Is Stock Not a Security?, 61 N.C.L. REV. 393
(1983); Comment, A Criticismof the Sale of Business Doctrine, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 974 (1983) (both
rejecting the doctrine).
4. Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982); Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied 45 1 U.S. 1017 (1981).
5. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd 105 S.Ct. 2297 (1985).
6. Christy v. Cambron, 710 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1983); Chandler v. Kew, Inc., 691 F.2d 443
(10th Cir. 1977).
7. King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342 (11th Cir. 1982).
8. See, e.g. Landreth, 105 S.Ct. at 2301.
9. See, e.g. King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 346 (11th Cir. 1982); Christy v. Cambron, 710 F.2d
669, 672 (10th Cir. 1983). See also infra text accompanying notes 47-61.
10. Seagrave Corp. v. Vista Resources, Inc., 696 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1982); Golden v. Garafalo,
678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982).
11. Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320 (3rd Cir. 1984), aff'd., 105 S.Ct. 2308 (1985).
12. Coffin v. Polishing Machines, Inc., 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 444 U.S. 868
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cuits rejected this "sale of business" exception, holding that the Acts
applied whenever an instrument called "stock" was transferred, if that
5
stock possessed the characteristics commonly associated with stock.'
These jurisdictions had taken a literal approach, reasoning that since stock
is one of the instruments defined as a security by the Acts, 16 the transactional context of the stock transfer was not relevant. 17
Landreth was the United States Supreme Court's first ruling on the
"sale of business" doctrine.' 8 In its decision, the Court adopted a literal
approach to9 the Acts' coverage and held that the Landreth stock was a
"security."' The Court stated that the "sale of business" doctrine did
not apply.2 This decision is important for all practitioners who work with
buyers and sellers of businesses because the Landreth holding imposes
potential federal securities law liabilities in situations where even the
smallest closely-held business is transferred through a stock sale. This
Note discusses the Landreth Court's rationale and the future impact of
the decision on securities law.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Landreth and his sons (hereinafter Landreth) were the sole shareholders
in a lumber business they operated in Tonasket, Washington. 2' A small
group of investors, backed principally by Dennis and Bolten,"2 expressed
(1979); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan Assocs. Inc., 496 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir.), cert. denied
419 U.S. 1023 (1974).
13. Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1983).
14. Cole v. PPG Indus., 680 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1982) (interpreting Arkansas law).
15. See infra text accompanying note 58.
16. See infra text accompanying note 64.
17. See, e.g., Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1144 (2d Cir. 1982), "We think the term
'stock' in the definition of 'security' in the '33 and '34 Acts should be read to include instruments,
such as these, which have the characteristics associated with ordinary, conventional shares of stock."
(rejecting the sale of business doctrine); Coffin v. Polishing Machines, Inc., 596 F.2d 1202, 1204
(4th Cir. 1979), "Absent some showing that ordinary corporate stocks are other than what they
appear to be, we need not consider whether an investor will derive his profit partly from his own
efforts." (rejecting the sale of business doctrine); Glick v. Campagna, 613 F.2d 31, 35 n.3 (3rd Cir.
1979), "[A] literal reading of the statute and governing precedent require that we consider this case
on the merits." (holding that sale of 50% interest in corporation to other 50% owner, structured
through stock sale was not a sale of a partnership interest, but a securities transaction within scope
of the Acts.)
18. Gould v. Ruefenacht, 105 S.Ct. 2308 (1985) is a companion case to Landreth. See infra note
97.
19. 105 S.Ct. at 2308.
20. Id.
21. 105 S.Ct. at 2300.
22. Dennis was a senior partner and tax attorney at the Boston law firm of Hale and Dorr. He
had extensive practical experience with business acquisitions and was co-founder, officer and director
of Standex Corporation, a Fortune 500 firm whose shares are traded on the New York Stock Exchange.
He was involved in numerous business sales, both as counsel for buyers and sellers of businesses
and also as a purchaser. Bolten had been the honorary chairman of the board and a major shareholder
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interest in purchasing the business.2 3 They conducted extensive pre-purchase investigations, including visits to the sawmill and assistance from
a sawmill engineering firm, a certified public accountant, and a bank
officer who was an expert on sawmill properties.24 Landreth insisted on
a sale of stock rather than a sale of the corporation's assets,25 and the
parties negotiated a stock purchase agreement for 100% of the lumber
company stock.26 Landreth declined an offer to continue in a management
position27 and his post-closing role was purely advisory." The business
did not live up to purchasers' expectations;29 Landreth Timber Company3 °
(hereinafter the Company) was unprofitable, sold the sawmill at a loss,
and eventually went into receivership."
Landreth Timber Company filed suit in the Western District of Washington seeking rescission of the stock sale and $2,500,000 in damages.3 2
The Company claimed that Landreth had widely offered and sold stock
in Standex. Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit at 2, Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1984).
(Hereinafter "Brief in Opposition.")
23. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1984).
24. 105 S.Ct. at 2301. See also Brief in Opposition at 2-3.
25. 731 F.2d at 1350. Although the transaction could "easily" have been structured as an asset
sale, Landreth preferred a stock sale for tax purposes. Brief in Opposition at 3.
26. 105 S.Ct. at 2301.
27. 731 F.2d at1350.
28. Id. See also Brief in Opposition, Appendix C, Admissions No. 32, 38, 42-49, 56, 59, 61,
62, 64-67, 72-81, 83, 85, 87.
29. 105 S.Ct. at 2301.
30. After the purchase, Dennis and Bolton assigned all of the stock to B & D Company, a
Delaware corporation formed for the purpose of purchasing the Landreth stock. B & D Corporation
then merged with the lumber company to form Landreth Timber Company, the petitioner. 105 S.Ct.
at 2301.
31. 731 F.2d at1350.
32. Id. Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 provides:
Any person who(1) offers or sells a security inviolation of section 77e of this
title
[section 5],
or
(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions of section
77c [section 3], other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of said section), by
the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not
knowing of such untruth or ommission), and who shall not sustain the burden of
proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing such
security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent
jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security with interest
thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender of such
security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
15 U.S.C. § 771.
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without registering it as required by the Securities Act of 1933.33 It also
alleged that Landreth had negligently or intentionally made misrepresentations and had failed to state material facts regarding the worth and
prospects of the timber company, in violation of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. 3"
Landreth moved for summary judgment on the ground that the sale of
the lumber company was not a transaction within the purview of the
Securities Act of 1933 or the Securites Exchange Act of 1934 because,
under the "sale of business" doctrine, the buyers had not purchased a
"security" within the meaning of those Acts. 35 The district court granted
Landreth's motion and dismissed the complaint for lack of federal subject
matter jurisdiction. 36 The district court noted that the stock possessed all
33. 731 F.2d at 1350. Section 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce
or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of any
prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has been filed
as to such security...
15 U.S.C. §77c.
34. 731 F.2d at 1350. Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. §78j.
Rule lOb-5, promulgated by the SEC to implement Section 10 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or,
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. §240.1Ob-5.
35. 105 S.Ct. at 2301. See infra text accompanying note 64.
36. 105 S.Ct. at 2301 (citing Petition for aWrit of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1984), Appendix
at 13a). (Hereinafter "Petition for Cert.") The district court opinion is unpublished but appears in
the appendices to the petitions for and brief in opposition to certiorari.
Landreth Timber is a typical "sale of business" doctrine case, in that the question of whether
there is a security is jurisdictional. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) grants federal jurisdiction for civil
actions "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." If a security is
involved, a plaintiff can bring an action in federal court under the federal securities laws. If the
challenged instrument is not a security, there is no federal jurisdiction unless other jurisdictional
requirements are satisfied (e.g. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982) (diversity of citizenship and the amount
in controversy exceeds $10,000 exclusive of interest and costs)).
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of the characteristics of conventional stock and that the term "stock" was
one of the enumerated instruments in the federal statutes. 37 However, the
court held that the federal securities laws did not apply to this sale of
100% of the stock of a closely held corporation.38 The district court ruled
that stock could not be considered a "security" unless the purchaser had
entered into the transaction with the anticipation of earning profits derived
from the efforts of others.39 Finding that managerial control had passed
to the purchasers, the Landreth transaction was a commercial venture
outside of the scope of the Acts, rather than a typical investment.'
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 4 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari42 because the circuits were
divided over the applicability of the federal securities laws when a business is sold by the transfer of 100% of its stock.43 In an 8-1 decision,
the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit."
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
The issue that the Court faced in Landreth was whether the sale of all
of Landreth's stock in a lumber business was a securities transaction and,
therefore, subject to the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
The Court also necessarily had to rule on the applicability of the "sale
of business" doctrine, because that doctrine had formed the basis of the
Ninth Circuit's decision.
The Supreme Court used a dual approach to hold that the Landreth
stock was a security and that the "sale of business" doctrine did not apply.
First, the Court literally interpreted the Acts' language, declaring that
normal stock will always be considered a security. Second, the Court
justified this bright line construction by examining the policies underlying
the Acts. Following a brief review of the "sale of business" doctrine and
its origins, this Note analyzes the Supreme Court's rejection of that
doctrine in Landreth.
A. The Sale of Business Doctrine
The "sale of business" doctrine posits that a sale of a business structured
through the sale of 100% of its stock is not a transaction in securities for
purposes of the Acts.45 While "stock" is one of the instruments listed as
37. 105 S.Ct. at 2301 (citing Petition for Cet, Appendix at 13a).
38. Id.
39. Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 47-61.
40. 105 S.Ct. at 2301.
41. 731 F.2d at 1353.
42. 105 S.Ct. 427 (1984).
43. 105 S.Ct. at 2301.
44. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court, 105 S.Ct. 2297, from which Justice Stevens
dissented, Id. at 2312.
45. See, e.g., Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1984); King v.
Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 345 (11 th Cir. 1982).
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a security in the definitional sections of the Acts, those sections are
preceded by the phrase "unless the context otherwise requires." 4 6 Jurisdictions accepting this doctrine have interpreted a sale of all of a cor-

poration's stock to be a context that requires the stock at issue not be

considered a security.47 These jurisdictions hold that the only context in

which a security is present is when there is an investment in a common
enterprise with the expectation of profits to be derived from the entre-

preneurial or managerial efforts of others.4 8 These jurisdictions derive
this method of analysis directly from two prior United States Supreme
Court cases: SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.49 and United Housing Foundation,
Inc. v. Forman. °
In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. the Supreme Court held that an unusual
instrument was an "investment contract" subject to the federal securities
laws. 5 The instrument challenged was a land sales contract for citrus
groves coupled with a service and management contract to maintain the
acreage. 52 The Court developed an economic reality test for an "investment contract": a "contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person
invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits
solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party."" Applying this
test to the instrument, the Howey Court elevated substance over form and
examined the underlying economic realities to determine that the instrument was an investment contract subject to the Acts. 54
Almost thirty years later, the Court again applied its economic reality
test to an unconventional instrument in United Housing Foundation, Inc.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 77b (Securities Act of 1933); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (Securities Exchange Act of
1934). See infra text accompanying note 64.
47. See, e.g., Chandler v. Kew, 691 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1977); Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637
F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 451 U.S. 1017 (1981); King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342 (11 th
Cir. 1982). In some cases, a sale of a "controlling" block of the stock will invoke the doctrine.
See, e.g. Colson v. Bertsch, 586 F.Supp. 1289 (D.N.J. 1984) (35%-49% stock interest); Cadiz v.
Jiminez, 579 F.Supp 1176 (D.P.R. 1983) (14% stock interest); Oakhill Cemetery v. Tri-State Bank,
513 F.Supp. 885 (N.D.Il1. 1981) (50% stock interest not security if owner has corporate control).
See also Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, Civ. No. 80-1097 (D.N.J. Apr. 15, 1983) (50% stock interest),
rev'd. 737 F.2d 320 (3rd Cir.), aff'd. sub nom. Gould v. Ruefenacht, 105 S.Ct. 2308 (1985). See
infra note 103 for discussion of Gould.
48. See, e.g., King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 346 (1Ith Cir. 1982) ("The purchasers' expectation
of profit would come from their own efforts, not those of others. This was not a security transaction
or investment contract intended to be governed by the Federal Securities Acts. "); Christy v. Cambron,
710 F.2d 669, 672 (10th Cir. 1983) ("It is clear that plaintiff's shares in the disco were not 'securities'
within the meaning of the federal securities law. The attribute of a security is that it represents an
investment in a venture which derives profits from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of
others. ").
49. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
50. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
51. 328 U.S. at 299.
52. Id. at 295-96.
53. Id. at 298-99.
54. Id. at 299.
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v. Forman.5 5 The Court determined that interests called "stock" in a non56
profit housing corporation were not securities covered by the Acts.
Although the instruments were called "stock," the Court reasoned that
it must determine whether the "stock" possessed "some of the significant
characteristics typically associated with" stock.57 The characteristics usually associated with common stock are: 1) the right to receive dividends
contingent upon an appropriation of profits, 2) negotiability, 3) the ability
to be pledged or hypothecated, 4) the conferring of voting rights in
proportion to the number of shares owned, and 5) the capacity to appreciate in value. 58 Since the instruments involved bore none of the characteristics of typical stock, they were not securities for the purposes of
the Acts. 59

In the second part of the Forman opinion, the Court analyzed whether
the "stock" could qualify as an "investment contract," one of the catchall instruments listed in the definitional section of the Acts.' Applying
the economic reality test devised by the Howey Court, it determined that
the "stock" was also not an investment contract and, therefore, not a
security.61

Thus, by applying the Howey economic reality test to an unconventional
instrument, the Forman court narrowed the Acts' scope. Forman, however, left an unanswered question: whether the economic reality test is
applicable only when an instrument does not first satisfy a normal attributes test, or whether it should be applicable to all cases. Jurisdictions
accepting the "sale of business" doctrine read Forman as supporting an
economic reality test in all cases; jurisdictions rejecting the doctrine read
Forman as requiring an economic reality test only if an unconventional
instrument was involved.
B. Statutory Analysis in Landreth
The Supreme Court in Landreth implicity answered the question left
unanswered in United Housing Foundation,Inc. v. Forman.62 It ruled that
55. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
56. Id. at 860. Tenants of the non-profit housing project had to purchase shares of "stock" in the
housing corporation in order to lease apartments. Id. at 842. The number of shares to be purchased
was based on the number of rooms in the apartment. Id. The shares did not pay dividends based on
the profitability of the corporation, nor could they appreciate in value since a tenant was forced to
offer them back to the corporation for the original purchase price if the tenant were vacating the
housing project. Id. Finally, the shares carried no voting privileges in proportion to the number of
shares owned. Id.
57. Id. at 851.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 851-58. See infra text accompanying note 64 for statute in pertinent part.
61. Id. at 858.
62. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
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the Acts would be interpreted literally to determine if the Landreth stock
was a security.63 Section 2 of the Securities Act of 1933 states:
When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires(1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock,
bond, . . . investment contract . . . or, in general, any interest or
instrument commonly known as a "security", or any certificate
of interest or participation in, termporary or interim certificate for,
receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing. 64
The Acts define a "security" as including "stock." Therefore, the face
of the definition shows that "stock" is to be considered a "security."6"
To justify its literal reading of the Acts, the Landreth Court stated that
the "context" of the transaction was "the sale of stock in a corporation. "66
This context was typical of the context in which the Acts normally applied.67 The Court emphasized that because the context was a typical
scenario in which the Acts would normally apply, an investor would
reasonably believe in the Acts' applicability.6" The Supreme Court refused
63. 105 S.Ct. at2302-03.
64. 15 U.S.C. §77b(1).
Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 states:
(a) When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires(10) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond ... investment contract .. . or in general, any instrument commonly known as a
"security"; or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of
the foregoing...
15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(10).
The Supreme Court has held that the definitions of "security" in the 1933 and 1934 acts are
virtually identical and will be treated as such in its decisions dealing with the scope of the term.
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 555 n.3 (1982); United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,
421 U.S. 837, 847 n.12 (1975).
65. 105 S.Ct. at2302.
66. Id. at 2303. This effectively overrules lower court cases characterizing the context of a
Landreth-type sale (i.e.
sale of allof a corporation's stock) as a sale
of a business, not a sale of a
security.
In dissent, Justice Stevens believed that the characteristics of the entire transaction are relevant
in determining whether a transaction in stock is covered by the Acts, because these considerations
are valid in determining if other instruments amount to transactions in securities. Landreth, 105
S.Ct. at 2313. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The decision to structure a transaction through the sale of
stock rather than the sale of assets usually depends on matters irrelevant to the federal securities
laws, such as tax liabilities, assignability of intangible assets, etc. Id. If Congress had intended to
provide a remedy for every fraud in the sale of a business or its assets, it would not have permitted
the parties to bargain over federal jurisdiction. Id. For example, if the Landreth sale had been
structured as an asset sale, there would be no security transaction and therefore no resulting federal
jurisdiction under the Acts. After Landreth, a purchaser can guarantee federal jurisdiction simply
by structuring a business sale as a stock transfer.
67. 105 S.Ct. at 2303.
68. Id. The Court contrasted Landreth with Forman. In Forman, purchasers of shares in a nonprofit cooperative housing project would not have reasonably believed that their transactions were
governed by the Acts. Id at 2302.
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to analyze the economic reality underlying the Landreth transaction; the
district court had determined that the Landreth stock possessed all of the
7
typical characteristics of common stock.69 It was, therefore, a security. "
As additional justification for its literal approach, the Court relied on
Congress' intent to protect investors. 7' Holding that the Landreth transaction was covered by the Acts would comport with Congress' remedial
purpose in passing the legislation.72 The Court acknowledged that Congress did not intend to provide a federal remedy for all fraud,73 but stated
that "it would improperly narrow" Congress' broad definition of security
if it exempted the Landreth stock from coverage, because stock is spe74
cifically included in the list of instruments defined as security.
Although it stated that the statutory analysis was sufficient to dispose
of the case, the Court proceeded to address concerns raised by Landreth
and the Ninth Circuit.7" First, Landreth urged the Court to rule that its
prior decisions required that courts look beyond the label "stock" and
the characteristics of the instruments involved to determine whether application of the Acts was mandated by the economic substance of the
transaction." Landreth argued that an economic reality test must be applied in each instance to determine if there was a security.77Furthermore,
Landreth claimed that the Acts should not apply to this sale because the
purchasers were not passive investors of the kind that Congress intended
the Acts to protect.78
69. Id. at 2302-03. The normal characteristics of stock were described in Forman, see supra text
accompanying note 58.
70. Id. at 2303.
71. Id. The Court later addressed Landreth's contention that Dennis and Bolton were not "investors." See infra text accompanying notes 86-91.
72. 105 S.Ct. at 2303.
73. Id. at 2303. The Court referred to Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982) to illustrate
this point. In that case, the Court held that a federally-insured certificate of deposit was not a security.
Marine Bank 455 U.S. at 555. While the definition of "security" is broad, the Court did not believe
that Congress intended to provide a broad federal remedy for all fraud, because the statute provides
that instruments are not securities if "the context otherwise requires." Id. at 556. Furthermore, it
is unnecessary to subject issuers of certificates of deposit to liability under the securities laws because
holders are already protected under the banking laws. Id. at 559.
74. 105 S.Ct. at 2303. In dicta, the Court later addresses the inconsistency of exempting certificates
of deposit from coverage while refusing to exempt stocks. See infra text accompanying notes 9298.
75. Id. at 2303.
76. Id. at 2303.
77. Id. at 2304.Landreth also relied on Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967), as mandating
a determination of whether the economic realities of a transaction call for application of the Acts.
Id. at 2304 n.4. In Tcherepnin, the Supreme Court stated "in searching for the meaning and scope
of the word 'security' in the [federal securities acts], form should be disregarded for substance and
the emphasis should be on economic reality." 389 U.S. at 366 (citing SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328
U.S. 293, 298 (1946)).
78. 105 S.Ct. at 2304.
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The Court agreed that prior Supreme Court cases had "not been entirely
clear on the proper method of analysis for determining when an instrument
is a 'security' "and cited cases where the Court had looked to the economic
substance of a transaction, rather than just to its form, to determine
whether the Acts applied. 79 However, the Court disagreed with Landreth's
claim that an economic reality test is required in all circumstances, and
refused to apply it for two reasons. First, all of the cases cited by Landreth
as requiring an economic reality analysis involved "unusual instruments." 80 In those cases, the instruments were not traditional securities.
Thus, the instruments could only be subjected to the Acts' coverage if
the economic realities indicated that the instruments were actually securities. 8 Therefore, the economic reality test had been used to include
non-traditional instruments in the definition of a security, not to exclude
traditional instruments from the statutory definition.8 2 The Landreth stock,
however, was traditional stock and plainly within the statutory definition.
Furthermore, the Court previously acknowledged the possibility that in
some cases an instrument would be a "security" simply by proving the
document to be what it purported to be.83 Second, the Court designed
the economic reality test to determine whether an instrument was an
"investment contract," not whether it fit into any other statutory definition
of security.84 If the Court applied an economic reality test to traditional
instruments, it would make the Acts' listing of specific instruments in the
definitional sections superfluous. 8"
Having disposed of Landreth's claim that an economic reality test is
required in all circumstances, the Court turned to his claim that the Acts
were intended to protect only passive investors and not privately negotiated transferees of control.86 Landreth claimed that Dennis and Bolton
79. Id. The cases cited were SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943) and SEC
v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1945).
80. 105 S.Ct. at 2304. These cases were: SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344,
351 (1943) (holding that leasehold interests in land near proposed oil well drilling were securities);
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1945) (holding that units of a citrus grove coupled
with a cultivating and marketing contract were "investment contracts" and therefore securities);
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858 (1975) (holding that instrument
called stock but which bore none of the characteristics normally associated with stock was also not
an "investment contract" under an economic reality test).
81. 105 S.Ct. at 2304.
82. Id.
83. Id. (discussing SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 355 (1943)).
84. 105 S.Ct. at 2305.
85. Id. See supra text accompanying note 64. This reasoning parallels the Second Circuit's in
Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1144 (2d Cir. 1982):
If an "economic reality" test were intended, reference to such specific types of
instruments, and common variations of them, would have been inappropriate
because a substantial portion of each class of instrument would, in fact, not be
within the definition. . . .If the "economic reality" test were to be the core of
the definition, only general catch-all terms would have been used.
86. 105 S.Ct. at 2305.
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were active entrepreneurs who sought to use or consume the business
purchased, just like the purchasers in Forman who sought to use the
apartments represented by shares of stock.87 Without answering the question of whether Dennis and Bolton were passive investors, or whether
that question was even germane, the Court noted that they had no intention
of running the sawmill themselves and that Landreth had in fact stayed
on to manage the daily affairs of the business.8 These facts opened
Landreth's assertion that Dennis and Bolton were not passive investors
to "some question." 8 9 In any event, the Court specifically disagreed with
Landreth's claim that Dennis and Bolton were not passive investors of
the kind that Congress intended to protect with the securities acts."
Furthermore, the Court asserted that to read the Acts as "cover[ing] only
passive investors" would contradict other portions dealing with tender
offers, disclosure of transactions by corporate officers and principal stockholders, and the recovery of short-swing profits gained by such persons.9
Having disposed of Landreth's claims, the Court turned to the concerns
raised by the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit had rejected the view that
the plain meaning of the definition would be sufficient to hold the Landreth
87. Id. at 2304.
88. 105 S.Ct. at 2307. This observation directly contradicts that of the 9th Circuit. See supra
text accompanying footnotes 27-28. See also Brief in Opposition at 3, "Upon closing, Dennis and
Bolten were the only directors ... Dennis became president, and other officers ... were designated
by Dennis and Bolten. Undisputed admissions of fact before the trial court established that Landreths
retained absolutely no post-closing control over management of the business, and had no ability to
determine the outcome of the purchasers' investment." (citations omitted).
89. 105 S.Ct. at 2307.
90. Id. at 2305. Justice Stevens, in dissent, believed that Congress did not intend the anti-fraud
provisions to apply to every security transaction. 105 S.Ct. at 2312. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Congress was primarily concerned with securities traded in a public market, and the Act's purpose
was to protect investors who had no access to inside information and were unable to protect themselves
from fraud by obtaining appropriate contractual warranties. Id.
91. 105 S.Ct. at 2305 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§78n, 78p). 15 U.S.C. §78n(d), "Tender offer by
owner of more than five per centum of class of securities; exceptions," provides:
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to make a tender offer for. . . [certain
securities] if, after consummation thereof, such person would, directly or indirectly, be the beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum of such class, unless
.. . such person has filed with the Commission a statement containing [certain
information].
15 U.S.C. § 78p(a), "Filing of statement of all ownership of securities of issuer by owner of more
than ten per centum of any class of security," provides:
Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10
per centum of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted security)
which is registered pursuant to section 781 of this title, or who is a director or an
officer of the issuer of such security, shall file. . . a statement with the Commission
. . . of the amount of all equity securities of such issuer of which he is the
beneficial owner . . . [and monthly supplements in months where ownership
changes].
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b), "Profits from purchase and sale of security within six months," provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship
to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale
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stock covered by the Acts, because it saw "no principled way" to justify
treating bonds, notes, and other categories differently.92 As support, the
Ninth Circuit also cited Forman93 for the proposition that it must investigate the "economic reality" of all transactions to determine if they were
transactions in securities.94 According to the Ninth Circuit, the "economic
reality" in Landreth was a sale of an entire lumber business, effected
through the sale of 100% of a corporation's stock, not an investment in
a security.9"
The Supreme Court expressly refused to decide whether coverage of
notes or other instruments could be provable by their names or
characteristics96 but pointed out why it thought that stock was distinguishable from other categories. First, stock is the "paradigm" of a
security and purchasers expect it to be covered by the Acts. 97 Second,
stock is easily identifiable from internal characteristics and more "susceptible" than other instruments to a plain meaning approach. 9"
and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer ... within any period of less
than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection
with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer,
irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or
officer ...
The Court, however, did not specify how such a reading would contradict the above quoted sections.
The Court appears to be blurring the distinction between "protection" of investors with "regulation"
of investors.
92. 105 S.Ct. at 2303. See Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348, 1353 (9th Cir. 1984). The Ninth Circuit
had applied a "risk capital" test to notes to distinguish investment transactions covered by the Acts
from routine commercial transactions which were not covered. id. Under this test, a note was a
security only if it was a contribution of risk capital subject to the entrepreneurial or managerial
efforts of others. Id. (citing Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir.
1976)). (This test is basically a form of the Howey Court's economic reality test, see supra text
accompanying note 53.)
Other jurisdictions accepting the sale of business doctrine had made similar distinctions. See,
e.g., Fredericksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1981) ("[T]he key to defining the
scope of the securities laws is whether the transaction is primarily for commercial (i.e., motivated
by a desire to use, consume, occupy or develop), or for investment purposes.") (holding that no
security was involved when purchaser took control of a corporation through a purchase of assets
and stock.).
93. 421 U.S. at 849.
94. Landreth, 731 F.2d at 1352. See also King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 345 (11th Cir. 1982)
("Based on the rationale of Forman, we reject a literal test and hold that the 'economic realities'
test is appropriate to determine whether a transaction involving stock in a corporation is a 'security
transaction' or an 'investment contract' governed by the Federal Securities Acts.").
95. 731 F.2d at 1353.
96. 105 S.Ct. at 2306.
97. 105 S.Ct. at 2306. See also Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496, 503 (5th Cir. 1983) for a
discussion of how an expectation of protection by the Acts should be a consideration in finding that
stock in a sale of business context is a security.
98. See text accompanying note 58 for a list of characteristics normally associated with stock.
The Court's analysis does not, however, answer the question of why stock is inherently more
easily identifiable than the notes that the Marine Bank Court found were not securities. 455 U.S. at
555. The Landreth Court admitted that notes "may now be viewed as a relatively broad term that
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C. Policy Considerationsin Landreth
The Court concluded with a discussion of the policy supporting its
decision. Acknowledging the absence of legislative history supporting its
broad interpretation of the language of the Acts, the Court provided its
own policy reasons for that broad interpretation. 99 First, the "sale of
business" doctrine rejected by the Court was based on the assumption
that control passed to the purchaser." 0t The Court pointed out that ascertaining whether control passed requires a district court to undertake extensive fact finding.'' Therefore, the district courts would be forced to
undertake a detailed factual investigation merely to determine whether it
had jurisdiction in the first place.
Second, and more important, determination of actual control involves
difficult questions of line drawing.'o The Court stated that if the sale of
business doctrine were applied to this case, it would also inevitably apply
to cases where less than 100% of a company's stock was sold.' 03 This in
encompasses instruments with widely varying characteristics, depending on whether issued in a
consumer context, as commercial paper, or in some other investment context," 105 S.Ct. at 2306;
yet the Court did not admit that stock could be situated or traded in a "consumer context ... or in
some other investment context." Therefore, the Court established that "context" for a note may be
the transactional context, but "context" for a stock must be completely internal to the instrument.
The court held only that stock was a category by itself for purposes of the Acts. Id.
99. 105 S.Ct. at 2306-07 n.7.
Justice Stevens in dissent believed that any policy consideration should be based solely on the
Congressional policy as reflected in the legislative history. 105 S.Ct. at 2313 n. 2. The legislative
history regarding the subject was silent; the majority should therefore have presumed that federal
legislation was not intended to displace state authority absent a clearly expressed intent to do so.
Id.
100. Id. at 2307.
101. Id. The Court noted that in this case the district court "was required to undertake extensive
fact-finding, and even requested supplemental facts and memoranda on the issue of control, before
it was able to decide the case." Id.
102. Id. This point had been relied upon by various lower courts that had rejected the doctrine.
See, e.g., Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496, 503 (5th Cir. 1983) ("[A] rule of law cannot be condemned
simply because it requires a court to decide on which side of the line a case falls. But given that
little will be gained from adopting the new rule, there is something to be said for simplicity and
predictability in the law"). See also Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1146 (2d Cir. 1982),
In "economic reality," considerably less than 100%, and often less than 50%,
of outstanding shares may be a controlling block which, when sold to a single
holder, effectively transfers the power to manage the business. Actual control
depends upon number and dispersal of shareholders, whether they be individuals, other businesses or institutional investors, and a variety of other facts
which render control a most uncertain test.
103. Landreth, 105 S.Ct. at 2307. See also Gould v. Ruefenacht, 105 S.Ct. 2308 (1985), a
companion case to Landreth. In Gould, Ruefenacht purchased 50% of the stock in a closely-held
corporation for cash and an agreement to participate in management. Id. at 2309. Ruefenacht
discovered that the business had been misrepresented to him and he filed suit alleging violation of
the Acts. Id. at 2301. The district court relied on the "sale of business" doctrine and granted summary
judgment for the defendants. Id. at 2309. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. Id. The Supreme Court relied on its decision in Landreth to affirm the Third
Circuit: the instruments purchased were called stock and possessed all of the characteristics usually
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turn would make coverage under the Acts depend upon such factors as
the percentage of stock transferred, the number of purchasers, and the
provisions for voting and veto rights agreed upon by the parties." The
Acts' coverage would, therefore, be "unknown and unknowable" at the
time of a sale.° 5 "These uncertainties attending the applicability of the
Acts would hardly be in the best interests of either party to a transaction. "106
IV. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

The Landreth holding answers many questions that had been troubling
the lower courts. First, the opinion indicates that all stock that bears the
normal characteristics of stock is a "security" for the purposes of the
federal securities laws. Second, the "context" of the sale, i.e., whether
one share or 100% of the shares are sold, is irrelevant. Also, the motivation of the buyer of this stock is irrelevant. The Acts now recognize
no difference between a passive investor and an active entrepreneur. After
Landreth, as long as a transaction is structured around a purchase of
"stock," the federal securities laws will apply, with all of their attendant
substantive and procedural advantages. 7 Finally, Landreth answers Forman's unanswered question: an economic reality test is required for "stock"
only when that "stock" does not bear the normal characteristics of stock.
Landreth established that if "stock" is stock, it is a security.
JAMES E. BURKE

associated with common stock. Id. The Court also reiterated its policy reasons for rejecting the "sale
of business" doctrine: application of the doctrine would depend on whether control has passed to
the purchaser, and control is ascertainable only after extended fact finding and litigation in the courts.
Id. at 2310-11.

104. 105 S.Ct. at 2307.
105. Id.
106. Id. Justice Stevens disagreed. He would limit the antifraud provisions to publically traded
securities or to those cases where an investor would be unable to obtain full information and
appropriate warranties before a purchase. 105 S.Ct. at 2313. There would be uncertainty, but that
uncertainty is not a strong enough policy consideration to justify the majority's "bright line" rule
that expands federal jurisdiction outside the scope of congress' concem. Id.
107. Substantively, under Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5, reliance is presumed if an omission
is material. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-54 (1972). Under
common law fraud actions, however, plaintiffs must prove reliance. See, e.g. W. Prosser, Handbook
of the Law of Torts, § 108 (5th ed. 1984). Procedurally, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides
broad venue provisions and nation wide service of process. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.

